Description
Product ID: | 9780192894267 |
Product Form: | Hardback |
Country of Manufacture: | GB |
Title: | The Tinkering Mind |
Subtitle: | Agency, Cognition, and the Extended Mind |
Authors: | Author: Tillmann Vierkant |
Page Count: | 208 |
Subjects: | Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Philosophy of mind, Cognition and cognitive psychology, Philosophy of mind, Cognition & cognitive psychology |
Description: | Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many areas of philosophy and cognitive sciences. But what is it? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct, incompatible definitions - intentional mental action, or a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency, both of which lead to surprising, counterintuitive consequences. Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many different areas of philosophy and the cognitive sciences. It is crucial in dual process theories of cognition as well as theories of metacognition and mindreading, self-control, and moral agency. But what is epistemic agency? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct and incompatible definitions. It can be simply understood as intentional mental action, or as a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency. The core argument of the book demonstrates that both definitions lead to surprising and counterintuitive consequences. If epistemic agency is a form of intentional action, then this implies that the radical theory of extended cognition has to be true. If, on the other hand, epistemic agency is not intentional action but evaluative agency, then intentional epistemic actions like deliberation are not truly cognitive but merely catalytic. Once established, the distinction between these two options sheds new light on various and diverse philosophical and psychological debates from dual process theories to debates on choice and self-control. |
Imprint Name: | Oxford University Press |
Publisher Name: | Oxford University Press |
Country of Publication: | GB |
Publishing Date: | 2022-10-06 |