Use coupon code “SUMMER20” for a 20% discount on all items! Valid until 2024-08-31

Site Logo
Search Suggestions

      Royal Mail  express delivery to UK destinations

      Regular sales and promotions

      Stock updates every 20 minutes!

      The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model

      1 in stock

      Firm sale: non returnable item
      SKU 9780691091846 Categories ,
      Select Guide Rating
      Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse select...

      £40.00

      Buy new:

      Delivery: UK delivery Only. Usually dispatched in 1-2 working days.

      Shipping costs: All shipping costs calculated in the cart or during the checkout process.

      Standard service (normally 2-3 working days): 48hr Tracked service.

      Premium service (next working day): 24hr Tracked service – signature service included.

      Royal mail: 24 & 48hr Tracked: Trackable items weighing up to 20kg are tracked to door and are inclusive of text and email with ‘Leave in Safe Place’ options, but are non-signature services. Examples of service expected: Standard 48hr service – if ordered before 3pm on Thursday then expected delivery would be on Saturday. If Premium 24hr service used, then expected delivery would be Friday.

      Signature Service: This service is only available for tracked items.

      Leave in Safe Place: This option is available at no additional charge for tracked services.

      Description

      Product ID:9780691091846
      Product Form:Paperback / softback
      Country of Manufacture:US
      Title:The Theory of Incentives
      Subtitle:The Principal-Agent Model
      Authors:Author: David Martimort, Jean-Jacques Laffont
      Page Count:440
      Subjects:Economic theory and philosophy, Economic theory & philosophy
      Description:Select Guide Rating
      Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability.
      Imprint Name:Princeton University Press
      Publisher Name:Princeton University Press
      Country of Publication:GB
      Publishing Date:2002-01-15

      Additional information

      Weight850 g
      Dimensions252 × 177 × 28 mm