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Getting Things Right: Fittingness, Reasons, and Value

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SKU 9780198810322 Categories ,
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Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain - the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They argue that fittingness is a norm...

£65.00

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Description

Product ID:9780198810322
Product Form:Hardback
Country of Manufacture:GB
Title:Getting Things Right
Subtitle:Fittingness, Reasons, and Value
Authors:Author: Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way
Page Count:224
Subjects:Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge, Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge, Ethics and moral philosophy, Social and political philosophy, Ethics & moral philosophy, Social & political philosophy
Description:Select Guide Rating
Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain - the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They argue that fittingness is a normatively basic property, on which all other normative properties depend.
Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. It seems fitting to admire Mandela, but not Idi Amin, and to believe that the Seine flows through Paris, but not that the Thames does. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain—the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They develop and defend a novel ''fittingness first'' approach, on which fittingness is a normatively basic property and all other normative properties depend on fittingness. They show how this approach illuminates central questions in ethics and epistemology.
Imprint Name:Oxford University Press
Publisher Name:Oxford University Press
Country of Publication:GB
Publishing Date:2022-10-28